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UAW Local 736 President 
In August 1980 General Motors announced that it was closing 
its Hyatt Roller Bearing Plant in Clark, New Jersey The union 
leadership at United Autoworkers Local 736, which had a history 
of militancy and a better-than-standard local contract, immediately 
mobilized to try to talk GM out of its shutdown plan. 
First, they offered to negotiate about possible contract 
concessions and to help GM develop new product lines for the 
plant. GM wasn't interested. Finally, they presented the union as 
a potential buyer of the plant through an Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan (ESOP). 
After a feasibility study was done and after more than a year 
of negotiations with GM, and numerous internal contentions 
within the local union, the Hyatt-Clark ESOP was formed as an 
employee-owned firm. The union and plant management raised 
$53 million to buy the plant, and agreed to pay GM $15 million 
more over the next 20 years in order to preserve special early 
retirement benefits guaranteed by plant closing language in the 
national contract with GM. 
More than half of the local's 1,600 members were eligible for 
the special early retirement package, and the overwhelming 
majority of them took it. The remaining 800 workers (along with 
management employees) formed the new company. 
The largest part of the money to form the new company was 
borrowed, and it is being paid back out of a 25% pay cut the 
workers agreed to. Along with the pay cut (from a plant average 
of about $12-an-hour to about $9-an-hour), the workers agreed to 
give up their COLA; to allow job combinations; to allow foremen 
to work; and to institute an incentive-pay system. 
In return for these concessions, the union won a profit-sharing 
0 
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plan and monthly productivity bonuses (on a plant-wide rather 
than individual basis). As the ESOP pays off the loans, shares oi 
stock in the company are distributed equally to every worker and 
manager, regardless of their salary level. Voting rights on that stock 
is one vote per person, and by 1991 the employees will elect half 
of the company's board of directors. 
The union also worked out a 3-year purchase agreement with 
GM, which guaranteed the new company a steady stream of 
orders during its first years. But Hyatt-Clark produces tapered 
bearings which are not needed on front-wheel-drive cars, and as 
GM and other automakers switch to front-wheel drive, demand 
for these bearings declines. It was hoped that the 3-year purchase 
agreement would allow the new company time to develop a 
business plan around new product lines compatible with the 
plant's equipment and the workers' skills. 
At the end of 1984, Hyatt-Clark Industries (HCIj employed 1,234 
union workers earning a plant average of $10 an hour. There are 
also 180 salaried employees. 
Jim May, UAW 736 president, was—along with Chief Steward 
Jim Zarello—one of the principal architects of the worker buy-out 
at HCI. Besides being local union president, May is also on the 
company's board of directors. Labor Research Review interviewed 
May in late December 1984, shortly after his local negotiated a 
new 3-year contract with the company its members own. 
LRR: Let's start with the company first. It's been in business for 
about three years now. How has it done? Has it been profitable? 
May: Yes. It has been profitable in the sense that we're not into 
a line of credit and we made a small profit as of the last six months. 
In the six months prior to that, we made a much larger profit. 
It's profitable just now and we see the potential of its continuing 
to be profitable. 
LRR: What about its future prospects? Have you found new 
products to offset the loss of demand for tapered bearings? Will 
the company still be dependent on GM as its principal customer? 
May: Currently 85% of its orders are from General Motors. When 
we started off, it was maybe 95% dependent on GM. Tapered 
bearings in the next three years will definitely be our big business. 
I don't see that changing much. But I do see new customers. I 
see a gradual swing, maybe from 85% swinging around so that 
by the end of this contract [1988] it will be maybe 50% of orders 
will be to other customers besides GM. And the railroad business 
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will bring many, many new cus tomers . . . . We've expanded our 
product line. We used to make solely 0-to-4-inch tapered bearings. 
We've expanded our product line now to make 0-to-8-inch tapered 
bearings. So it lets us be much more diversified. 
LRR: How about the union? When you first proposed the idea 
of a worker buy-out, the majority of your membership rejected 
it. And even after they later approved the ESOP deal you 
negotiated, some of your members filed a duty-of-fair-
representation case with the NLRB against the union. Is there still 
a lot of dissension within the local over whether the buy-out was 
the right thing to do? 
May: The members that were dissatisfied, out of a group of 800 
that left the company, maybe a group of 20 filed a court case—it 
wasn't an NLRB case; it was in federal court. The court, two days 
prior to the buy-out, dismissed that case as having no merit. 
As far as there being a lot of dissension within the local union 
about whether the buy-out was the right thing to do or not, we 
just had an election this year for officers of the union. And, 80% 
of our Executive Board ran unopposed. Jim Zarello for shop 
chairman and bargaining chairman—he's run unopposed for the 
last two terms. And myself, I ran unopposed for president. So I 
would think that that speaks for itself, that people think the buy-
out was the right thing to do. And the fact that if the buy-out had 
not been done, the plant would have been closed three years ago 
and there wouldn't be jobs for over 1400 people here today. 
LRR: We've been told that there is a lot of anger at the company 
among your members, and that recently there's been a couple of 
work slow-downs and even sabotage of several machines. Is this 
true? If so, is this because of management's day-to-day practice 
of labor relations or is it because of what they asked for in 
negotiations? 
May: In regards to the sabotage, that is grossly exaggerated. It 
wasn't in this case. We had a person who was changing his shift, 
he was finishing his shift, and he did not leave his set-up in line 
for the next shift operator to come in and pick it up. It was one 
isolated case. So it was far from being sabotage. 
As far as the work slow-downs, I've got to say there was a 
demoralization of the work force last April when the Board of 
Directors voted not to pay a profit-sharing to all employees of the 
company. The contract calls for X percentage from profits to be 
paid out. It came to over $600,000 to be distributed to the entire 
work force. In the contract, the Board of Directors has to approve 
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that, and they chose not to approve it. They chose to take the 
$600,000 and invest it in new equipment, plant modernization and 
that. This created a great deal of dissension among the workers: 
And the work effort slowed down. . .yeah. 
As to the labor relations practices, I don't think it's the day-to-
day labor relations practices. I believe it's just the differences of 
management and unionism. And mainly Al Lowenstein—he's 
chairman of the board—trying to give directions and to 
communicate to workers when he's incapable of doing that. 
Lowenstein is definitely anti-union and has got no idea of working 
with people. He's not capable of relating to workers. He's an 
obstructive force. 
LRR: But it was basically a disagreement over how to spend the 
profits, right? 
May: Yes. Jim Zarrello and myself took the position at the board 
meeting that even if you're not going to distribute the whole 
amount of money that the people are entitled to, give them a 
percentage of it, show them that you do get rewarded for doing 
more work. And that appeal fell on deaf ears, I'm afraid, or it 
certainly did not convince the directors that that was the best way 
to go. 
LRR: What did the company ask for in negotiations, and what 
did the local union give and get? What role did General Motors 
play in these negotiations? 
May: Oh, GM played a major role in the negotiations. Instead of 
a labor contract deadline, we were faced with a customer deadline. 
General Motors said that if we didn't have a contract before the 
expiration of our old agreement, they would place orders 
somewhere else. They set a date and we had to meet that date. 
As far as what the company asked for in negotiations, the 
company started out by saying they did not want to pay for any 
union representation. They did not want the check-off. They were 
really, really far right in their demands. In contrast to that, the 
local was seeking what could probably be called to the left of 
center. We were asking for revolutionary changes in worker 
participation, "revolutionary" in the sense of corporate America. 
We were wanting input at all levels of the management of the 
company. 
LRR: Without going into all the details of the contract, basically 
what was the outcome? 
May: Well, we still have the check-off. And we still have 
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management paying for the union representation. As far as our 
demands are concerned, we have works councils, we have a 
contract council, and we have participative management groups 
at all levels. So, we think we've done really, really well in 
contractual language on participation. 
LRR: What about wages? Has there been a wage increase? 
May: Yes. 50* an hour for all employees for the first year and the 
second year, and 55* in the third year. 
LRR: You and two other union members are on the 13-member 
board of directors. What kind of influence do you all have there? 
Did the board discuss the company's bargaining demands while 
the three of you were present? What conflicts-of-interest have you 
experienced between being an owner-director, on one hand, and 
the local union president, on the other? 
May: Well, the first part there, that it's "myself and two other 
union members," that's not quite accurate. It's myself and the 
union shop chairman, Jim Zarrello, and then we selected another 
outside director and that's Warner Woodwroth, a professor at 
Brigham Young University. 
Did the board discuss the company's bargaining demands? 
When the board was meeting to discuss the union demands, they 
requested that we leave the board meeting, and we did that. When 
they were going to discuss salary increases, we asked that the 
salary representatives on the board [management] leave, but they 
didn't think that was necessary, so we lost that. That was a conflict 
in my mind. If the union representatives have got to leave the 
board meeting because of discussing hourly contracts, then I think 
salary representatives should leave when we're discussing salary 
increases. But the board did not agree with that. 
Conflicts between being an owner-director and a local union 
president? I don't have a conflict. If you're a president of a union, 
or any union official for that matter, the first thing should be the 
job security of your membership. And if you're a director of a 
company, your main interest should be the good and welfare of 
all the company and all its employees. So, a healthy company is 
a secure company, and a secure company means security of the 
work force. So, it's not conflicting to me. 
LRR: Have shop-floor relations changed much since the buy-out? 
Weren't there supposed to be "works councils" to solve shop-floor 
problems democratically? How have these worked? Have they 
interferred with your grievance procedure? 
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May: Okay. They didn't start working the first year the company 
was in operation. It took a long time to get them going. But we 
finally did get them going, and they went very successfully at all 
levels of the company at the manufacturing end of it. 
Each department did their own little groups, did their own little 
meetings, and any problems they had that they couldn't resolve 
among themselves, they could refer them to the works counci l -
or it was actually the Thursday morning meeting, where the 
chairman of the shop committee, Jim Zarrello, and the plant 
manager, Mike Giordano, alternated the chairing of the meeting. 
All managers were present, and all union committeemen were 
present, and it worked really, really well. A lot of things got 
resolved. Problems that were on the floor that the groups couldn't 
resolve themselves—health and safety, easier working 
conditions—all things were discussed and resolved. 
It went well . . .up until the salaried people in the company went 
and hired a lawyer. They started to give this lawyer their 
complaints. So the union at that point said that we want the 
salaried people to bring their complaints to us, and they voted not 
to do that. And we said, well this is not participative management, 
and stopped going to the meetings. We said if salaried people have 
a problem, we want to know about it, we want to address the 
problem. They shouldn't have to retain lawyers and all that. When 
management voted against doing it that way, we said, well, all 
you're doing is using union officials, using union members to 
advance the cause of manufacturing, and it should be dealing with 
all issues. So we stopped meeting. 
LRR: You're not meeting now at all? 
May: Well, in the new contract it's now a matter of contractual 
language. Now we have to meet and they have to meet and we 
have to discuss all problems. Before, in the contract we just lived 
under, that wasn't written language. Now there's language that 
says both parties have to do it. 
LRR: And that's language you went after, that the union sought 
in the contract? 
May: Oh, very much so, yes. 
LRR: When it was working, did you see any interference with 
the grievance procedure? 
May: No. No, it was totally separate. In fact, in many cases, it 
turned out you didn't need the grievance. If a committeeman had 
a problem, or if an individual had a problem, the individual or 
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committeeman could bring it up to any of these participative 
management groups, and they could resolve it. If you brought it 
up for the Thursday morning meeting, you had the plant chairman 
and the plant manager there, and they could just turn around and 
come to an agreement, mutually agree, with the interests of all 
management and all union officials. So it was really, really helpful. 
LRR: One of the early press stories reported union stewards saying 
that under the worker-ownership arrangement they no longer feel 
their old desire to defend every worker against discipline, even 
if he or she is guilty. Is that the union's attitude now? And if so, 
do you think that undermines the worker's legal right to 
representation as part of an adversarial proceeding? 
May: I would say that we were a very militant union prior to 
becoming HCI. We would defend workers and maybe distort the 
facts to represent the workers. As far as if a person is not guilty 
today, I think this union would move mountains to prove them 
innocent if they genuinely believed they were innocent. In other 
areas where we know the person to be guilty of any infraction, 
we have counselling. If it's not a violent violation, then there's 
counselling done and there's a much more amicable agreement. 
You try to get the worker to stop their practices. I enjoy that. 
As for defending the innocent, we'll move mountains to defend 
innocence. And I really must say that some of the managers are 
interested in that, too. We have "innocent until proven guilty" in 
some disciplines—like being late and being absent and all that. 
And now we've got a much better role in that we use counselling, 
honest open counselling between the shop steward and the 
manager. The counselling works very well. 
LRR: And in your contract you have "innocent until proven 
guilty"? 
May: Oh yes. 
LRR: Is that provision a general feature of auto contracts? 
May: No. No, I don't know any labor contract that has it. 
LRR: When the ESOP was set up, it was hoped that the profit-
sharing plan and productivity bonuses would make up for a good 
part of the income workers lost with the 25% pay cut. Has that 
happened? Are those programs working and are they popular with 
your members? 
May: The programs are not working. Profit-sharing, that's where 
the Board of Directors last April did away with that, they vetoed 
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that. So, then you've got to say that that part was not working. 
The productivity bonuses, we're getting some of that. But the 
language of the contract and the intent of the contract, it would 
have worked. What happened here was we had been 
manufacturing bearings under General Motors and borderline 
quality was being accepted then. When we took over as Hyatt-
Clark Industries, all of a sudden the standards changed. And they 
were demanding top quality from all our pieces. So all of a sudden 
we find our former employer was demanding that we meet 
specifications, and we're now doing that. And General Motors is 
reaping the benefits of having all top quality bearings. 
So, we believe the new standards have been restrictive and our 
productivity has been hurt. But the quality is there and we've 
overcome all these setbacks and we're looking forward to three 
years of really good work, and really good productivity, and good 
sales. Our customers are reaping the benefits of these changes. 
LRR: Union critics of the Hyatt-Clark ESOP say that your local's 
wage concessions, by undercutting wage standards in the auto 
parts industry, played an important role in establishing a 
bargaining climate that led to widespread concessions throughout 
the auto industry. Do you agree, even in part, with that 
assessment? And, if so, do you feel that your obligation to your 
local membership overrides your general commitment to union 
solidarity and maintaining industry-wide standards? 
May: I would certainly say, speaking in behalf of all the bargaining 
committee and the executive board of this union, our local 
membership's interests override any general commitment to union 
solidarity. 
As far as us setting a climate for concessions, that's far, far, far 
away from the facts. We were faced with going out of business. 
We were faced with a company closing the doors. We made 
concessions, but the concessions we made were to ourselves. We 
didn't make a concession to any corporation or any other company. 
We're trying to own this company. So the concessions were to 
ourse lves . . . . We took concessions to own a company. The auto 
industry unions made concessions, but they don't own anything. 
We're going to end up owning a company. 
LRR: How have the International and other local UAW leaders 
in the parts industry responded to Hyatt-Clark? There is an 
impression that your local is pretty much an outcast within your 
union. Is there anything to that? Conversely, are there elements 
within the UAW which have been supportive of your efforts? 
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May: That's very much true that when we were trying to establish 
this ESOP, the Region 9 of the UAW was not helpful. In fact, they 
were very obstructive. That has greatly changed, greatly changed. 
There's a new leadership in Region 9 of the UAW, and we find 
our regional director and his staff are really helping us, working 
with us. 
The International, we haven't had much help at all. After we 
established it, the International sent one of the regional directors 
down—from Region 1-E of the UAW—with the shop committee 
from a Chrysler plant. Both Jim Zarello and I met with them, and 
made suggestions to them on how they could save their plant. 
Their plant was being threatend with closure. It was a Chrysler 
trim plant. They met with us, and then they went back, and they 
negotiated some agreements with Chrysler Corporation, and that 
plant today is still open. I like to think that Jim and I had some 
contribution to that. 
There's a UAW plant in West Pittston, Pennsylvania, that Jim 
and I were asked to go and help. They were closing, and these 
people bought the plant, with the help of our attorney, Craig 
Livingston. And these employees now own that company. 
In Connecticut, at Bridgeport Brass, another union shop was 
closing down. UAW Region 9 Director Tom Natchuras asked us 
to see if we could help them. So again, with our lawyer, Craig 
Livingston—Jim Zarrello, myself and the entire shop committee 
met with these people. And we helped them and now I. believe 
their ESOP is going to be started shortly, if it's not already started. 
So, the relationship with the International union and the 
Regional has greatly improved. We've got no complaints at all. 
LRR: One final question. Based on your three years of experience 
with worker-ownership, what would you tell other unionists who 
might be considering the possibility of a worker buy-out to save 
their plant? 
May: Could I turn your question around? A lot of people have 
asked me what I'd have done differently. If I had one thing I could 
wish for, what would I have done differently? And I would say 
I would have had a bargaining agreement for the salaried 
employees of the company. Because then both sides know what 
they're going in with. The salaried people have a contract and 
union membership has a contract, and that will free both under 
umbrellas of protection for constructive criticism, and it saves a 
lot of dissension. I really believe t h a t . . . . That way they are free, 
and can feel free and can safely criticize constructively, and have 
honest input into all phases of the operation. • 
I 
